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Measuring the Efficacy of Leaders to Assess Information and Make Decisions in a Crisis:  
The C-LEAD Scale 
 
Abstract 
 
Based on literature and expert interviews, we developed the Crisis Leader Efficacy in Assessing 
and Deciding scale (C-LEAD) to capture the efficacy of leaders to assess information and make 
decisions in a public health and safety crisis. In Studies 1 and 2, we find that C-LEAD predicts 
decision-making difficulty and confidence in a crisis better than a measure of general leadership 
efficacy. In Study 3, C-LEAD predicts greater motivation to lead in a crisis, more crisis leader 
role-taking, and more accurate performance while in a crisis leader role. These findings support 
the scale’s construct validity and broaden our theoretical understanding of the nature of crisis 
leader efficacy. 
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Measuring the efficacy of leaders to assess information and make decisions in a crisis:  
The C-LEAD Scale 
 
1. Introduction 
  During any public health and safety crisis, whether it is an airplane crash, hurricane, 
infectious disease pandemic, or terrorist act, there is a tremendous need for effective leadership. 
In particular, good decisions must be made quickly, despite the uncertainty, time pressure, and 
high stakes associated with such a crisis (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Furthermore, information must 
be assessed and decisions must be made among all those involved in the response effort, from 
the senior federal officials directing from a command center, to the local personnel treating the 
affected in the field (Gorge, 2006; Mitroff, 2004). Despite the significant and widespread need 
for capable leaders in a crisis, however, prior research and theory has not provided a tool with 
which to assess the efficacy of individuals to perform these essential tasks of information 
assessment and decision making while under crisis circumstances. The current research aims to 
develop and validate such a tool so that we may increase our ability to recognize, train, and 
leverage those current and potential leaders who will be effective decision-makers in a crisis. 
In general, research on crisis tends to be conceptual (e.g., Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; 
Sweeny, 2008) or based on unique case studies of singular events, such as the Challenger 
explosion (Vaughan, 1996) or the Iraq war (Bateman, 2008), although a few researchers have 
conducted crisis field studies (e.g., Pillai & Meindl, 1998) and laboratory experiments (e.g., 
Halverson, Murphy, & Riggio, 2004; Hunt, Boal, & Dodge, 1999). This literature has been 
useful in providing broad frameworks of crisis management with an emphasis on the role of 
transformational and charismatic leadership approaches (e.g., Halverson, et al., 2004; Pearson & 
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Clair, 1998). However, there is very little research about the specifics of how leaders effectively 
respond to a crisis (e.g., Sweeny, 2008; Wooten & James, 2008) and how the capabilities of 
leaders can be assessed in advance of a crisis occurring (Schoenberg, 2005). Such knowledge is 
necessary to develop a more systematic and comprehensive understanding of the nature of crisis 
leadership and facilitate the development of capability-building interventions before crisis events 
occur. In this paper, we present an empirically-derived measure of effective crisis leadership, the 
Crisis Leader Efficacy in Assessing and Deciding scale (C-LEAD). We focus on a leader’s self-
efficacy to perform two core aspects of crisis response: assess information and make decisions 
(Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005; Coombs, 2005; Wooten & James, 2008).  
Self -efficacy is a personal judgment of “how well one can execute courses of action 
required to deal with prospective situations” (Bandura, 1982, p. 122) and is related to actual 
performance in a number of different contexts (Hannah, Avolio, Luthans, & Harms, 2008; Saks, 
1995; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). In empirical tests using C-LEAD, we explore the nature of 
crisis leader efficacy and its relation to other constructs. Overall, the current research provides a 
new means of assessing an important aspect of crisis leadership and lays the groundwork for 
additional research, theory, and practice in the area. 
1.1 Crisis leadership in public health and safety crises 
  As we have seen throughout history, the consequences of ineffective leadership in a crisis 
can be both costly and deadly (Mitroff, 2004; Tichy & Bennis, 2007). Our research focuses on 
public health and safety crises, which are defined as a low-probability, high-impact events that 
threaten the security and well-being of the public (adapted from Pearson & Clair, 1998). We 
focus on public health and safety crises because such crises have received less attention in 
leadership research than other forms of crises, such as corporate scandals and financial crises 
 C-LEAD Scale  4
(e.g., Fowler, Kling, & Larson, 2007; Pang, Cropp, & Cameron, 2006), and yet they carry 
enormous significance for human life and safety. As is true for most forms of crisis, public health 
and safety crises involve ambiguity in terms of cause, effect and means of resolution (Dutton, 
1986; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Quarantelli, 1988), as well as urgency to resolve the situation as 
quickly as possible (Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980; Quarantelli, 1988). In addition, the 
stakes involved in public health and safety crises are extraordinarily high: the lives and welfare 
of human beings are at risk (Mitroff, 2004; Shrivastava, 1993). Given the scope and magnitude 
of such crises, leadership challenges can be extreme (Mitroff, 2004). 
In a crisis, leaders are called upon to perform many actions, including clarifying the 
situation to external audiences, conveying hope and resoluteness to the public, and providing 
motivation and coordination to the workers (Mitroff, 2004). To date, the crisis leadership 
literature has largely focused on the emergence of charismatic or transformational leaders and 
their effectiveness in crisis (e.g., Bass, 1998; Halverson, et al., 2004). However, at a more basic 
level, the successful resolution of a crisis can be seen as a series of decisions and judgments 
(Aguilera, 1990). For example, in a hurricane response effort, data must be gathered regarding 
the extent of the damage, including the number of people killed or injured and the number of 
buildings and roadways destroyed. Accordingly, leaders must decide how to distribute personnel, 
aid supplies, and money. Thus, information assessment and decision making are two core 
behaviors that are critical for effective crisis leadership (Boin, et al., 2005; Coombs, 2005; 
Klann, 2003; Leonard, 2004; Useem, Cook, & Sutton, 2005; Wooten & James, 2008). 
Information assessment includes determining both structural aspects of information flow, 
such as how to collect and identify data needed for crisis resolution, and procedural aspects of 
analysis, such as how to prevent errors and reduce biases (Coombs, 2005). Both the type and 
 C-LEAD Scale  5
quantity of information gathered are important for the resolution of crisis situations, often 
requiring the access of multiple, unique data sources (Fearn-Banks, 1996; Hirokawa & Keyton, 
1995). In addition to information gathering and assessment, researchers have argued theoretically 
(e.g., Boin, et al., 2005) and empirically (Hale, Hale, & Dulek, 2006; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & 
Theoret, 1976) that decision making is a key task for leaders in crisis situations (Aguilera, 1990; 
Smart & Vertinsky, 1977; Wooten & James, 2008). Crisis decision making involves generating 
response options, using criteria to evaluate the best course of action, and making 
recommendations or taking action as a result (Mintzberg, et al., 1976; Sweeny, 2008).  
Crisis leaders are required to perform these tasks of information assessment and decision 
making under tremendous psychological and physical demands (Klann, 2003; Leonard, 2004). 
The core elements that define a crisis—ambiguity, urgency, and high stakes—also severely 
constrain the ability of individuals to assess information and make decisions effectively (Boin, et 
al., 2005; Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron, & Byrne, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1998). As Dutton 
(1986) notes, it is difficult and perhaps even impossible to achieve a full and complete 
understanding of the nature, underlying reasons, influence mechanisms, and consequences 
involved in a crisis. In addition, because leaders in crisis situations are under severe time 
pressure, they often have less time to acquire, secure, and process information effectively (e.g., 
Halverson, et al., 2004; Quarantelli, 1988). Furthermore, the life and death stakes involved in the 
situation are only likely to amplify the sense of time pressure and its desultory effects upon 
information exploration and decision processing (Mumford, et al., 2007; Sayegh, Anthony, & 
Perrewe, 2004; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Therefore, the inherent demands of a public 
health and safety crisis are likely to severely constrain an individual’s ability to assess 
information and make decisions successfully.  
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The capability of leaders to assess information and make decisions despite the challenges 
that crises present is the central topic of the current investigation. Effective performance on these 
tasks is influenced by many factors, including characteristics of the individual and of the 
situation (e.g., Pearson & Clair, 1998; Staw, et al., 1981). Correspondingly, our work explores 
experiences and capabilities that may influence crisis leader efficacy, including developing and 
practicing crisis response protocols and being efficacious as a leader in general. We also examine 
several outcomes to crisis leader efficacy, including the motivation to lead in a crisis, role-taking 
of leadership positions in a crisis, and the accuracy, difficulty, and confidence associated with 
making decisions in a crisis context. Finally, we consider certain individual difference 
characteristics, such as learning goal orientation, intelligence, and divergent thinking, that may 
influence the relationship between crisis leader efficacy and performance. 
1.2 Contributing factors to crisis leader efficacy 
Procedural forms of crisis preparedness. Currently, great effort and expense are being 
directed toward the development and testing of crisis response plans in the United States (Lee, 
Woeste, & Heath, 2007; Leonard & Howitt, 2006; Reddick, 2007) and countries around the 
world. We define procedural preparedness as the outcome of establishing or practicing official 
emergency response protocols (e.g., developing plans and running drills). Underlying these 
activities is the assumption that preparedness will enhance the capabilities of individuals to 
respond successfully to a crisis (Mitroff, 2004; Pearson & Clair, 1998). However, given the 
demands of a crisis, such preparation efforts may not inoculate individuals against more pressing 
“in-the-moment” challenges to assess information and make decisions (Coombs, 2005; Mitroff, 
2004). Previous research on the impact of acute stress, for example, indicates that people will 
revert to their dominant response instead of a recently learned behavior in those circumstances 
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(Dickerson & Kemey, 2004; Staw, et al., 1981). Thus, efforts by leaders to develop and practice 
crisis response protocols may generally increase their sense of efficacy to perform leadership 
tasks in a crisis, but these steps may not guarantee successful information assessment and 
decision making in an actual crisis situation. 
Efficacy as a leader in general. Crisis leader efficacy is also likely to be dependent to 
some degree upon an individual’s general leadership capabilities. Leadership efficacy is defined 
as a person’s confident belief that they have the knowledge, skill, and ability to lead others 
effectively (Anderson, Krajewski, Goffin, & Jackson, 2008; Hannah, et al., 2008; Paglis & 
Green, 2002). Past research indicates that the nature of leadership in general (i.e., leadership in 
non-crisis situations) is not wholly separable from leadership in crisis situations (Evans, 
Hammersly, & Robertson, 2001). For instance, we would expect that many of the basic skills of 
transformational leadership (e.g., creating vision and inspiring others) would be also important in 
a crisis context (Evans, et al., 2001). However, compared to ordinary circumstances, the 
importance of decision making is magnified during crisis and it is more challenging (Mumford, 
et al., 2007). As Sommer and Pearson (2007) note (citing Parry, 1990), “A crisis affects 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral aspects that constrain rationality and cause greater 
vulnerability than in normal, non-crisis states” (p. 1237). Therefore, general leader efficacy is 
likely to be a potential contributor to crisis leader efficacy, but it may not be dictate whether an 
individual is able to competently assess information and make decisions in a crisis fraught with 
ambiguity, time pressure, and life and death outcomes. Other characteristics, such as the ability 
to remain calm under duress, may be more relevant to the development of crisis leader efficacy. 
1.3 Outcomes of Crisis Leader Efficacy 
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Motivation to lead in a crisis. Self-efficacy to perform a particular task or behavior is 
typically though to lead to higher levels of motivation to do so (Bandura, 1986, 1997). Thus, 
high self-efficacy to perform the critical crisis leader tasks of information assessment and 
decision making is likely to be associated with high motivation to demonstrate those skills by 
leading in an actual crisis. As a construct, motivation to lead is defined as a person’s desire to 
engage in leadership training, roles, responsibilities, and behaviors (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007; 
Tschan, Semmer, & Inversin, 2004). Chan and Drasgow (2001) showed that leader efficacy in 
general is empirically related to higher motivation to lead. Although motivation to lead 
specifically in a crisis has not yet been studied, we do know that crisis leaders with high efficacy 
tend to exert more effort towards actions and persevere when facing difficulties (Bandura, 1997; 
Gist, 1987; Hannah, et al., 2008). Thus, we would expect that a greater sense of crisis leader self-
efficacy would lead to higher motivation to lead in a crisis. 
Crisis leader role-taking. Both elements of leadership efficacy and motivation are also 
likely to impact the degree to which individuals take on leadership roles in a crisis. According to 
(Bandura, 1986, 1997), self efficacy influences the choices people make and the courses of 
action they pursue: individuals tend to choose tasks and activities they believe that they can best 
perform and avoid those they do not feel confident in accomplishing. As noted earlier, the scope 
of a public health and safety crisis generates opportunities to display leadership in regard to 
information assessment and decision making throughout the response effort. The degree to which 
individuals feel efficacious should therefore directly predict the degree to which they take on 
new or enhanced leadership roles to perform these tasks.  
In addition, irrespective of their feelings of efficacy, those individuals who are highly 
motivated to lead in a crisis can be expected to take on greater levels of leadership roles in a 
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crisis. Indeed, previous research has found that motivation to lead positively predicts leadership 
role-taking in the military (Amit, Lisak, Popper, & Gal, 2007). Overall, a sense of self-efficacy 
to assess information and make decisions in crisis situations, as well as a high level of motivation 
to lead in a crisis more generally, are both likely to contribute to greater leadership role-taking 
during the occurrence of an actual crisis. 
Crisis leader performance. Given that crises include many complex factors that make 
alternative outcomes difficult to assess or predict, crisis leader performance is often problematic 
to measure precisely. The decision making literature assumes that leaders who make good 
decisions are choosing the optimal alternative and are thus most accurate in their choices 
(Hogarth & Makridakis, 1981; Mumford & Connelly, 1991). However, in a crisis, an ideal 
solution is often not knowable until it is too late, if at all (Batemen, 2008). Although decision-
making accuracy may be difficult to capture in real-world crisis situations, theoretically, leader 
efficacy and role-taking should be correlated with more accurate performance (Day, Sin, & 
Chen, 2004). In situations in which many of the environmental variables can be controlled, such 
as in training simulations, it may be possible to see a more transparent and direct relationship 
between crisis leader efficacy and the accuracy of crisis decisions. 
Measures that capture the effectiveness of the decision making process, such as the 
difficulty and confidence that leaders experience while assessing information and making crisis 
decisions, are other potentially important indicators of leader performance (e.g., Dearstyne, 
2007; Frohman, 2006; Hogarth & Makridakis, 1981; Weber & Johnson, 2009). For example, 
although leading in a crisis is unlikely to be easy for any individual, we expect that some leaders 
will experience relatively more strain than others when facing the challenges of searching for 
information, determining and evaluating response choices, and making decisions in this context 
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(e.g., Aminilari & Pakath, 2005; Dearstyne, 2007; Frohman, 2006). This relatively higher level 
of strain experienced while performing leadership decision-making tasks may be associated with 
poorer decision quality and lower leadership effectiveness in general (Kayes, 2004; Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001; Tett, Guterman, Bleier, & Murphy, 2000). In addition, the 
confidence that leaders have in the decisions made under crisis conditions is likely to be based 
upon their assessment of the quality of the decision-making process involved, including the 
degree to which alternatives were considered and how well downsides were mitigated (Sweeny, 
2008; Tett, et al., 2000). Thus, in addition to the accuracy of decisions made, two additional 
indicators of crisis decision-making quality are the difficulty and confidence that leaders 
experience in making their decisions. All of these outcomes should be predicted by the self-
efficacy of the individual to perform these tasks.  
1.4 Influences on the efficacy-performance relationship 
There are many characteristics of individuals that may influence the link between their 
level of crisis leader efficacy and their actual ability to assess information and make decisions in 
a crisis. In general, a crisis is a unique and extreme situation that may require new ideas or 
creativity in information assessment and decision-making (Amabile, Hadley, & Kramer, 2002). 
Those individuals with high levels of certain types of cognitive characteristics, such as learning 
goal orientation, intelligence, and divergent thinking, may be more successful at performing 
these tasks in a crisis, especially if they believe strongly in their efficacy to do so (Brockner & 
James, 2008; Dweck, 1990; Gibson, Folley, & Park, 2009; Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998; Wood 
& Bandura, 1989)  
Learning goal orientation. The orientation of a leader toward learning will influence how 
they process information and make decisions in a crisis. Learning goal orientation is an 
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individual trait that reflects being motivated to focus on task mastery for the sake of learning and 
growing; it is often contrasted to a performance goal orientation that reflects being motivated to 
demonstrate that one is competent in reference to an external comparison (Dweck, 1990; 
Hofmann, 1993). With a learning goal orientation, leaders are more open-minded, exploratory 
and are more adaptive in their response to adverse conditions, which is important for crisis 
decision making (Brockner & James, 2008; Cron, Slocum, VandeWalle, & Fu, 2005; Dweck, 
1990). For example, when perceiving a threat, the level of learning goal orientation may 
contribute to whether the leaders will be open to learning about the situation before making a 
decision (Brockner & James, 2008; Button, Mathieu, & Zajac, 1996). In general, a learning goal 
orientation is associated with cognitive experimentation or flexibility, which could allow for 
more successful crisis resolution (Davis, Mero, & Goodman, 2007). 
Intelligence. There are many different definitions and implicit theories of intelligence, 
including general intelligence, emotional intelligence, and the bioecological model of 
intelligence (e.g., Barron & Harrington, 1981; Boyatzis, 2006; Riggio, Murphy, & Pirozzolo, 
2002; Sternberg, 1988). A model of intelligence that is often applied to the leadership domain is 
the ability to learn and the ability to adapt to environments (Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998). While 
intelligence is valued in leadership and decision making in general, intelligence could be 
especially important in a crisis due to the fast-paced, challenging context (e.g., House & Aditya, 
1997; Judge, Colbert, & Ilies, 2004). 
Divergent thinking. Research suggests that divergent thinking is a key component of 
creative thought and flexibility in problem solving under various conditions (Gibson, et al., 2009; 
Guilford, 1959; Mumford, Marks, Connelly, Zaccaro, & Johnson, 1998). Divergent thinking is 
signified by the generation of multiple alternative solutions to problems (Gibson, et al., 2009; 
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Guilford, 1950; Guilford, 1959; Mumford, et al., 1998). Prior research suggests that the quantity 
and quality of divergent thinking may be reduced and even disappear under stress, such as 
extreme time pressure (Abualsamh, Carlin, & McDaniel, 1990; Amabile, et al., 2002). 
Nonetheless, the degree to which divergent thinking is incorporated in a crisis is likely to 
influence how successful the leader is in assessing information and making decisions. 
  Overall, previous theory and research indicates that a learning goal orientation, 
intelligence, and divergent thinking ability are all characteristics that should enhance an 
individual’s ability to effectively assess information and make decisions in a crisis. However, 
these characteristics are likely to be especially important under conditions of high self-efficacy. 
Self-efficacy should increase the motivation by individuals to harness all of their capabilities to 
perform effectively in the target situation, and as Wood and Bandura (1989)  note, “the richer the 
repertoire of sub skills that people possess, the easier it is to integrate these skills in the 
production of new behavior patterns” (p. 363). Therefore, the individual characteristics of 
learning goal orientation, intelligence, and divergent thinking may serve to enhance the strength 
of the relationship between crisis leader efficacy and crisis performance.  
1.5 Assessing crisis leader efficacy and performance 
There are many challenges associated with conducting research on crisis phenomena, 
including gathering data in the moment of catastrophe. Often, data collection cannot be planned 
in advance because, by their very nature, crises are unanticipated. Once a crisis has begun, 
researchers are unlikely to gain access to data collection due to the organization’s focus on 
managing the crisis itself or to concerns about its public image or liability (Pearson & Clair, 
1998). It is therefore extremely difficult to gather data across many individuals and situations to 
broaden the generalizability of findings. 
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With such a complex and difficult-to-access phenomenon, determining the appropriate 
way to measure leaders’ information assessment and decision making capacity in a crisis is no 
easy task. We selected self-efficacy as our measurement construct for three primary reasons. 
First, self-efficacy has been empirically shown to predict important outcomes, including 
organizational dynamics (Saks, 1995), training behaviors (Combs & Luthans, 2007), and work 
performance (Eden, 1995; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). In particular, a meta-analysis by 
Stajkovic and Luthans (1998) found a significant correlation between work-related self-efficacy 
and work performance of .38. This suggests that measuring an individual’s self-efficacy to 
perform in a crisis will in fact be positively correlated with their actual performance in a crisis. 
Second, a self-efficacy measure locates the construct at the individual level, which allows it to 
capture variance among different leaders responding to the same crisis. Third, self-efficacy has 
the advantage of being open to influence (e.g., by training; Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002; 
Hannah, et al., 2008), rather than a trait-like quality that will remain fixed (Stajkovic & Luthans, 
1998). This makes self-efficacy especially useful not only from the standpoint of identifying and 
assessing the quality of leadership in crises, but also for improving it.  
1.6 Overview of research objectives 
The three objectives of the current investigation are to develop a scale measure of leader 
efficacy to assess information and make decisions in a public health and safety crisis, to validate 
this measure, and to use this measure to explore the nature of crisis leader efficacy. First, we 
develop and test a measure of crisis leader efficacy, the C-LEAD scale. Scale items are generated 
based upon the literature and interviews with crisis experts, and refined in a series of preliminary 
empirical tests. Next, the resulting C-LEAD scale is compared to an existing measure of general 
leader self-efficacy in two studies using different target populations and decision-making 
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settings. In the third study, we elaborate further upon the discriminant and predictive validity of 
C-LEAD using a simulated crisis decision-making task. From the results of the three studies, we 
present an initial framework of the nature of crisis leader efficacy in regard to assessing 
information and making decisions. The framework specifies the likely relationships among crisis 
preparedness activities, crisis leader efficacy, motivation to lead in a crisis, role-taking of crisis 
leadership positions, and crisis decision-making performance. We also explicate the potential 
moderating role that many individual characteristics, including learning goal orientation, 
intelligence, and divergent thinking, may play in the efficacy-performance relationship. 
2. Development of crisis leader self-efficacy instrument (the C-LEAD scale) 
The items of the C-LEAD scale were originally generated through a review of prior 
research and interviews with crisis experts. We reviewed the literature on crisis leadership (e.g., 
Bennis, 2004; Boin, et al., 2005; Klann, 2003) to identify the key elements of effective leader 
behaviors to include in our scale. In the literature, we found repeated references to the 
importance of effective information assessment and decision making in a crisis (e.g., Rosenthal 
& 't Hart, 1991; Sayegha, Anthony, & Perrew, 2004). Thus, we decided to address those two 
critical forms of crisis leader behavior and named our instrument the Crisis Leader Efficacy in 
Assessing and Deciding scale (C-LEAD). 
To develop specific items for the scale, we conducted interviews with women and men 
who had successfully led others during a previous public health and safety crisis. Interviewees 
were identified through referrals provided by experts in the field (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). 
To solicit referrals, we first compiled a list of programs, centers, and institutes that offer training 
and/or research expertise on the topic of crisis leadership, particularly in the areas of public 
health and safety in the United States. In total, 28 programs were identified. We next contacted 
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the program directors, asking them to recommend individuals who had demonstrated effective 
leadership during a prior public health or safety crisis. We screened the recommendations for 
appropriateness for our study, resulting in 57 unique names. Fifty of these leaders (88%) agreed 
to be interviewed, 11 women and 39 men. Interviewees came from both federal and state public 
health departments, emergency response agencies (e.g., fire, police), elected positions, and 
government agencies. Twenty-two leaders described natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes and 
floods), 18 described crises intentionally caused by humans (e.g., 9/11 terrorist attacks, anthrax, 
and riots), and 10 described crises unintentionally caused by humans (e.g., vaccine shortages, 
disease outbreaks, power outages, and fires). 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted by telephone and lasted approximately one 
hour. In brief, we introduced the project and asked interviewees to describe their roles in 
resolving the crisis. Next, we probed for information about their actions, emotions, and thoughts 
during major stages of the crisis response. In the interviews, we also asked about prior crisis 
experiences and personal characteristics that helped them lead effectively during the crisis. 
Finally, we asked for general impressions about crisis leadership, differences between crisis and 
non-crisis leadership, and overall thoughts, impressions, and lessons learned. All interviews were 
conducted by one of two researchers, and interviewees were assured of confidentiality. 
Interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. The interview transcripts were coded and analyzed 
for the critical actions, emotions, and cognitions the interviewees undertook or experienced as 
they responded to the crisis. From this analysis, we confirmed that successful crisis leaders 
consistently demonstrated an ability to effectively assess information and make decisions despite 
the pressures and constraints posed by the crisis situation, and therefore we used this information 
to generate initial items for the C-LEAD scale. 
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In preliminary tests, we varied C-LEAD scale items, instructions, and response sets 
among 1,688 individuals who were members of a research panel. The protocol used and 
demographic characteristics of the participants in the pretest studies were very similar to those in 
Studies 1 and 3, except that the surveys were exclusively used to identify scale items with high 
internal reliability that still contained external validity to the literature and interviews. Further 
information on the pretests is available from the first author. At the end of the pretest period, we 
derived a 9-item C-LEAD scale that showed promising psychometric properties. The original C-
LEAD scale was used in Studies 1 and 2, and the final scale (after slight modifications to some 
of the items to enhance their clarity and crisis nature) was used in Study 3. Table 1 contains the 
C-LEAD scale.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
  We conducted three empirical studies to establish the construct validity of the C-LEAD 
scale. The objective of the first study was to demonstrate that our measure of crisis leader 
efficacy had strong intrinsic psychometric properties and was distinguishable from an existing 
measure of general leader efficacy. In this case, we tested C-LEAD and the comparison measures 
in a general leadership decision-making context to show that C-LEAD could not be used to 
replace an existing measure of leadership efficacy. In the second study, our objective was to 
reverse this finding; in this case, we tested the measures in a crisis context to show that C-LEAD 
was better able to predict decision-making performance in a crisis context than comparison 
measures. Finally, the objective of the third study was to explore how C-LEAD predicted other 
outcomes, such as motivational states and leader role-taking, as well as additional aspects of 
crisis decision-making performance. The third study was also designed to explore potential 
individual difference moderators of the efficacy-performance relationship.  
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3. Study 1: Initial construct validity of C-LEAD 
  The first study was designed to establish the scale’s internal reliability, discriminant validity 
from other measures, and predictive validity of decision-making performance. Since C-LEAD is 
specific to leadership in a crisis, we sought to differentiate our scale from a measure of 
leadership in ordinary times. For this comparison, we used a previously validated measure of 
general leader efficacy. Additionally, we examined the C-LEAD scale in relation to a measure of 
crisis preparedness (e.g., developing protocols, practicing responses). Finally, we used our scale 
to predict two important indicators of effective decision-making processes: the difficulty and 
confidence leaders experience in making decisions. In the current study, a survey was 
administered to a diverse set of managers in regard to general leadership decisions.  
3.1 Participants and procedures 
 Internet-based  surveys  were  distributed through a survey administration company that has 
a panel of approximately 2.5 million participants across the United States. To ensure that our 
participants had leadership experience, we required that they were a manager of others at work, 
as measured by having at least one subordinate reporting to him or her. We did not correspond 
directly with the participants; the research company administered the survey through their 
communication channels and provided the data to us without any personally identifying 
information. 
Our sample included 161 men and 121 women (a 23.5% response rate among those 
solicited for our survey). The average participant was 45 years old and most (57.8%) had a four-
year college degree or higher. Participants supervised an average of “between 10 to 14 
subordinates” and had been working for their employer for an average of 9.6 years. More than 19 
different occupational fields were represented in the sample, including those in the 
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private/business (81.6%), public/government (8.5%), non-profit/charitable (4.3%), and academic 
(3.5%) sectors. The majority of participants were in a position of formal authority to direct others 
at work in the event of a public health and safety emergency (67.7%).  
Participants completed the 9-item C-LEAD scale as well as other scale measures on the 
survey. The Leadership Self-Efficacy scale (LSE; Paglis & Green, 2002) assessed the degree to 
which participants judged that they could accomplish general leadership tasks in the areas of 
setting a direction for the group, gaining followers’ commitment, and overcoming obstacles. The 
LSE contains 12 items that are averaged together to create a measure of overall leadership 
efficacy, including, “I can develop plans for change that will take my group in important new 
directions” and “I can figure out ways for my group to solve any policy or procedural problems 
hindering our change efforts.” Participants also completed a scale created for the study that was 
designed to assess procedural preparedness for a crisis situation. The scale included six items: (1) 
“I know who to call if I receive a report of an occurring or impending crisis,” (2) “I am unsure 
what my role and responsibilities would be in a crisis,” (3) “I frequently review the crisis 
response plans that my unit has in place,” (4) “I have adequately practiced my unit’s crisis 
response plan,” (5) “I keep others at work up-to-date on the best way to reach me in a crisis,” and 
(6) “I do not believe my unit’s response plan is the best it can possibly be.” Items (2) and (6) 
were reverse-scored and a mean was calculated. All three measures used 7-point ratings scales 
that ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
The survey also included a section devoted to making general leadership decisions. 
Participants were given a series of four vignettes and asked to make decisions about how the 
protagonists should proceed (adapted from Kane, Zaccaro, Tremble, & Masuda, 2002). For 
example, one of the situations involved assuming the role of a Vice President of a company who 
 C-LEAD Scale  19
had to decide how to handle a situation in which an important work group was failing in its 
mission. Decision options included performing motivational activities with the group and 
replacing the person in charge of the work group. For each scenario, participants were given four 
equally viable decision options (Kane, et al., 2002), as well as the option to not make a 
recommendation. After making a decision, participants indicated the level of difficulty they 
experienced in making this decision and the level of confidence they felt about it on 5-point 
Likert response scales that ranged from 1 (Not at All) to 5 (Extremely).  
3.2 Analysis of construct validity properties of C-LEAD scale 
  We present the basic psychometric properties of the C-LEAD, LSE, procedural 
preparedness, decision difficulty and decision confidence measures in Table 2. As shown, the C-
LEAD measure showed strong internal validity. The correlations among the main study variables 
also appear in Table 2. As expected, results indicate that C-LEAD was positively correlated with 
LSE and with procedural preparedness at moderately high levels. As shown, C-LEAD, LSE, and 
procedural preparedness show some differences in regard to the participants’ difficulty and 
confidence in making general leadership decisions. Specifically, all three variables were 
significantly negatively correlated with the decision difficulty variable so that higher levels of 
crisis leader efficacy, general leader efficacy and procedural preparedness were all associated 
with less difficulty making general leadership decisions. A similar pattern was found for the 
decision confidence variable. However, as will be presented in the next section, multiple 
regression analyses showed that only LSE predicted general decision difficulty and confidence 
when C-LEAD and procedural preparedness were entered as comparison variables. 
  Separate correlation analyses with the participant demographic variables showed that C-
LEAD was correlated with whether or not participants were in a position of formal authority in a 
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crisis (r = .19, p <.01) and the number of subordinates they had (r = .20, p <.01). C-LEAD was 
not correlated with any other job or demographic background variables. LSE was correlated with 
whether or not participants were in a position of formal authority in a crisis (r = .21, p <.01), 
number of subordinates (r = .17, p <.01), tenure at the employer (r = .14, p <.05), and gender (r = 
.20, p <.01), with women having higher general self-efficacy scores relative to men. Procedural 
preparedness was correlated with whether or not participants were in a position of formal 
authority in a crisis (r = .27, p <.01), number of subordinates (r = .20, p <.01), and tenure at the 
employer (r = .15, p <.05).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.3 Discussion of initial findings regarding construct validity of C-LEAD scale 
  The current study provides initial evidence of the construct validity of the C-LEAD scale,  
as indicated by its psychometric properties and discriminant validity from other related variables 
(Campbell, 1960). For psychometric properties, the scale showed high internal reliability and a 
mean and standard deviation consistent with the pre-validated measure of leader self-efficacy. In 
terms of the discriminant validity of the C-LEAD scale, participant scores on C-LEAD and LSE 
overlapped by approximately 50%, but this result is consistent with the expectation that crisis 
leader efficacy is related to, but distinct from, general leader efficacy. Importantly, the study 
demonstrated differences between C-LEAD and LSE for the prediction of a critical leadership 
behavior (i.e., making decisions). Results indicated that LSE predicted the level of difficulty and 
confidence experienced by individuals making decisions in a non-crisis context better than did 
C-LEAD. Therefore, C-LEAD is not merely a substitute for a measure of general leader self-
efficacy as applied to everyday leadership decision-making situations. In general, the findings 
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suggest preliminary differences between our measure of crisis leader efficacy and general leader 
efficacy. 
Finally, the C-LEAD scale was significantly and positively correlated with the measure 
of procedural preparedness at moderate levels, which again is consistent with our expectation. 
However, in terms of background characteristics, procedural preparedness was solely 
distinguished from C-LEAD in its significant relationship to tenure at the employer. Procedural 
preparedness did predict general decision difficulty at a more significant level than C-LEAD, 
although it was less important to this outcome than LSE. Overall, the results of the current study 
suggest some distinctions between our measure of crisis leadership efficacy and our measure of 
procedural preparedness for a crisis, at least in the context of general leadership decisions. 
4. Study 2: Discriminant validity of C-LEAD scale 
Our goal with the second study was to further test the construct validity of the C-LEAD 
scale, particularly in regard to its discriminant and predictive validity. For the current study, we 
surveyed crisis responders at a federal agency in the United States who were undergoing an 
extensive agency-wide simulation of a pandemic influenza outbreak. This study complemented 
Study 1 by demonstrating the relative usefulness of C-LEAD in predicting decision-making in a 
crisis context, as compared to measures of general leadership efficacy and procedural forms of 
crisis preparedness. 
4.1 Participants and procedures 
Survey data were collected at a United States federal agency in association with an 
ongoing series of crisis preparation exercises. The training exercises involved elaborate 
simulations in which personnel responded to a pandemic influenza outbreak. A total of 380 
representatives from more than fifteen different functional areas and multiple levels of the 
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agency were invited to engage in the simulations exercised during data collection. Our sample 
included 85 participants who completed our primary survey, 51 of whom also completed one 
measure on a follow-up survey (representing a 22.4% and 13.4% response rate of those invited, 
respectively). The primary sample included 31 men and 52 women (two participants did not 
indicate gender), with an average age of 45 years of age. The sample was well-educated; 79.4% 
had a masters degree or higher. On average, participants supervised at least one subordinate and 
had been working for their employer for a range of 7 to 8 years. A total of 24.0% had formal 
authority to direct others in a public health and safety crisis (note that at the agency, “formal” 
authority implied a specific title or designation). Participants reported on average that they were 
“somewhat familiar” with the crisis response protocols of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and of their employer. Participants had completed an average of 9.7 preparedness 
exercises in the past five years and had experienced 2.4 terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other 
public health and safety emergencies while at work.  
  To preserve the anonymity of participants’ email addresses and identities, a note of 
introduction including an electronic link to the surveys was distributed by electronic mail to all 
invitees on our behalf by one of the exercise coordinators. The first survey was distributed over a 
four-day period prior to the reconvening of the exercise, during which several key issues of the 
previous exercise phase had been left unresolved. Three days after the new exercise phase ended, 
using the same delivery method, we distributed a follow-up survey to collect an additional 
measure. On the first survey, we collected data on C-LEAD, LSE, procedural preparedness, and 
decision-making variables, as well as participant background information (e.g., participants’ 
crisis experience and training, job characteristics, and demographic traits). The follow-up survey 
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included a standard measure of self-presentation bias, the Social Desirability Scale Short Form 
(SDS; Reynolds, 1982). 
Instead of using the vignettes describing general leadership scenarios as a basis for 
decision-making as in the previous study, in the current study we asked participants to make 
decisions regarding three issues that were central to both the crisis simulation exercise and to an 
actual pandemic influenza outbreak. The crisis-related issues were: (a) what stage of alert the 
U.S. and world should be in, (b) what local communities should do to protect their residents, and 
(c) how the agency should deploy responders to the field. Pilot testers at the agency confirmed 
that each of the issues presented to participants were fundamental to an actual pandemic 
influenza crisis and realistic in the sense that they contained elements of ambiguity (e.g., the 
exercise data made it unclear if the situation was a true pandemic or not), urgency (e.g., the 
influenza strain was rapidly spreading across the U.S. in the simulation), and high stakes (e.g., 
several people had already died from influenza infection in the simulation). We expected that 
participants would be highly engaged in resolving these issues as each had been designated by 
the simulation planners as central to the exercises and was unresolved at the time of data 
collection.  
  For each of the three crisis issues, participants were asked to choose a recommendation 
from a set of four options; they were also given the option to not make a recommendation at that 
time. Previously, experts at the organization had validated that each of the four recommendation 
options were equally viable and reasonable responses to the issues, and thus participants were 
told that there were no obvious “right” or “wrong” choices among the options. After each issue 
was presented and decided upon, participants described how difficult it was to make their 
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decision and how confident they were that it was the right one using 5-point Likert scales 
ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 5 (Extremely).  
4.2 Discriminant validity of C-LEAD scale 
  The psychometric properties of the C-LEAD, LSE, procedural preparedness, Social 
Desirability Scale, decision difficulty, and decision confidence measures are shown in Table 3; 
C-LEAD again demonstrated strong internal reliability. Table 3 also shows the correlations 
among the main scale variables collected in Study 2. As shown, C-LEAD was significantly 
positively correlated with LSE and with procedural preparedness, at levels consistent with Study 
1. None of the variables were significantly correlated with the Social Desirability Scale. 
Furthermore, the results show that C-LEAD was uniquely (negatively) correlated with the level 
of difficulty experienced in making crisis decisions; LSE and procedural preparedness were not 
correlated with this variable. C-LEAD was also significantly correlated with greater levels of 
crisis decision confidence, unlike LSE. Procedural preparedness was correlated with decision 
confidence, but at a less significant level than C-LEAD.  
  Separate correlational analyses showed that C-LEAD was positively correlated with the 
level of familiarity the individuals had with the response protocols of the DHS (r = .24, p <.05) 
and of their employer (r = .28, p <.05). No significant relationships were found for C-LEAD 
with the other background characteristics measured. LSE was significantly correlated with the 
number of subordinates (r = .30, p <.01), whether in a position of formal crisis authority (r = .23, 
p <.05), familiarity with DHS response protocols (r = .35, p <.01), and familiarity with employer 
response protocols (r = .38, p <.01). Procedural preparedness was significantly correlated with 
whether in a position of formal crisis authority (r = .30, p <.01), familiarity with DHS response 
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protocols (r = .43, p <.01), familiarity with employer response protocols (r = .51, p <.01), and the 
number of training exercises participated in the past five years (r = .32, p <.01).   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
  Another view of the differences among C-LEAD, LSE, and procedural preparedness is 
found by comparing the relationship between these variables and the decision-making variables 
collected in the first two studies. We had theorized that a measure of general leader self-efficacy 
(LSE) would be more effective at identifying those who experienced greater difficulty and less 
confidence while making decisions in a general leadership context than our crisis-specific 
measure. We further proposed that C-LEAD would be more effective than both LSE and 
procedural preparedness in identifying those leaders who experienced greater difficulty and less 
confidence making decisions in a crisis context. As shown in Table 4, we ran two separate 
regression analyses using the same paradigm of entering C-LEAD, LSE, and procedural 
preparedness as predictors of the decision difficulty and confidence measures. As shown in 
Study 1, when the difficulty and confidence measures were collected in the context of general 
leadership decisions, only LSE remained a significant predictor of these outcomes. However, in 
Study 2, when the difficulty and confidence measures were collected in the context of crisis 
leadership decisions, C-LEAD showed superior predictive ability over these comparison 
measures.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.3 Discussion of initial findings regarding construct validity of C-LEAD scale 
The current study generated several important findings regarding the construct validity of 
the C-LEAD scale. In regard to psychometric properties, the level of internal reliability found 
among C-LEAD items was strong within a population comprised of experts in public health and 
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safety crises. Moreover, C-LEAD was not correlated with the Social Desirability Scale, which 
indicates that although it is a self-report measure of efficacy, it does not simply measure the 
desire to present oneself in a favorable light. 
In terms of the discriminant validity of the C-LEAD scale, the findings with participant 
demographics and background data suggest further differences between our measure of crisis 
leader efficacy and general leader efficacy. We found that C-LEAD scores continued to be 
generally independent of the participant background characteristics. On the other hand, LSE was 
consistently correlated with position-related aspects of leadership, including whether the 
individual had formal authority to direct others in a crisis and the number of employees 
supervised. Thus, the findings indicate that efficacy in a crisis context may be less related to 
positional characteristics of leadership such as the size of one’s subordinate pool reporting to 
individuals, than efficacy in regard to leadership in general.  
  In addition, the current study provides strong evidence that crisis leadership efficacy is 
related to, but distinguishable from, more procedural aspects of preparing for a crisis. Although 
C-LEAD was significantly and positively correlated with procedural crisis preparation, we found 
important differences between the measures in terms of how they related to background 
characteristics. For example, the level of procedural preparedness was more strongly related to 
participants’ familiarity with the DHS’s and their employer’s formal crisis response protocols 
than was C-LEAD. Furthermore, unlike C-LEAD, higher levels of procedural preparedness were 
associated with the individual’s position of formal authority to lead others in a crisis and the 
number of preparedness exercises participated in the past five years. 
  Most notably, the results of Study 2 demonstrate differences between C-LEAD and the 
comparison measures of LSE and procedural preparedness with regard to the prediction of a 
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critical leadership behavior (i.e., making decisions). Previously, Study 1 indicated that LSE 
predicted the level of difficulty and confidence experienced by individuals making decisions in a 
non-crisis context better than did C-LEAD. Therefore, measures of general leader self-efficacy 
are likely to be more useful than C-LEAD in projecting capabilities in everyday leadership 
decision-making situations. However, in situations involving crisis decisions, as found in Study 
2, C-LEAD was more meaningful than a general leader self efficacy measure. In this case, higher 
C-LEAD scores were significantly correlated with lower levels of difficulty and higher levels of 
confidence in regard to decisions and recommendations made in a crisis context, but higher LSE 
scores were not. Finally, the level of the individual’s procedural crisis preparedness did not relate 
to the level of difficulty and confidence they experienced making decisions in a crisis context 
when compared to C-LEAD. Thus, the results indicate that C-LEAD captures an individuals’ 
ability to assess information and make decisions in a crisis context better than a measure of the 
extent to which individuals have prepared and practiced response protocols. In total, these results 
demonstrate that our measure of crisis leader self-efficacy shows promise of being both 
theoretically and empirically distinct from measures of general leader self-efficacy and 
procedural forms of crisis preparation. 
5. Study 3: Development of crisis leader framework 
  In the third study we sought to extend our empirical and theoretical investigation of the 
nature of crisis leader efficacy by conducting a longitudinal study with managers that included 
additional comparison and performance measures. In this study, we investigated the ability of C-
LEAD to predict several new outcomes: motivation to lead in a crisis, voluntary role-taking of 
crisis leadership positions, and decision-making accuracy as a leader. We also incorporated 
individual difference variables as potential moderators of the crisis leader efficacy-performance 
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relationship. From these findings, we developed an initial framework of the nature of crisis 
leader efficacy.  
5.1 Participants and procedures 
  The procedures of the current study were very similar to that of Study 1 in that we 
distributed electronic surveys to organizational leaders through a survey administration 
company. The main difference is that we collected data on two surveys that were separated by 
approximately 10 days in time. In total, 300 managers (67.7% males) with an average age of 42 
years completed both surveys (a 37.6% response rate among those solicited specifically for our 
study). In general, the participants were well-educated (74.7% had a four-year college degree or 
higher degree), had worked in their chosen fields for an average of almost 15 years, and typically 
supervised between 5 and 9 subordinates. Most worked in private organizations (63.7%), but 
others worked in public/government (17.0%), academic (7.3%), and non-profit (7.0%) ones. 
They had experienced an average of at least one public health and safety crisis while in a 
position of authority at work and had participated in approximately eight crisis training exercises 
in the past five years. The majority of respondents (64.7%) reported being in a position to 
formally direct or supervise other employees in their organization in the event of a public health 
and safety crisis. Many had some outdoor survival training (49.0%) and most (64.7%) had been 
camping at least five times before, background that is relevant to the crisis decision-making task 
involved in the study. 
  To reduce common method bias, we distributed the measures across two separate surveys 
that were administered approximately 10 days apart. The first survey collected data on crisis 
leader efficacy (C-LEAD), motivation to lead in a crisis, divergent thinking, procedural 
preparedness, and participant demographic characteristics. The second survey contained 
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measures of learning goal orientation, intelligence, and crisis decision-making performance. The 
measures of C-LEAD and procedural preparedness were consistent with those used in the 
previous two studies. 
For motivation to lead in a crisis, we adapted the items in Chan and Drasgow’s (2001) 
general measure of motivation to lead. For example, we adapted the original item “I am the type 
who would actively support a leader but prefers not to be appointed as leader” to “In a crisis, I 
am the type who would actively support a leader but prefers not to be appointed as leader.” In 
doing so, we reduced the total number of items from 27 in the original scale to 12 in the crisis 
version for space considerations. The measure used a 7-point rating scale that ranged from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
For divergent thinking, we used the traditional (Guilford, 1967) paradigm in which 
participants were asked to generate as many novel uses as possible for common items in a short 
timeframe. In this case, we provided participants with two minutes each to generate uses for a 
brick, pencil, and shoe. The divergent thinking responses were coded based on the criteria of 
fluency (number of valid responses), flexibility (number of categories used), elaboration, and 
originality (as adjusted by level of fluency). Coding was performed by two researchers. An initial 
average reliability across categories and uses between the two coders was .78; differences were 
discussed and resolved. A single performance score was created for each individual by summing 
across these different characteristics for each of the three uses tested (see Gilhooly, Fioratou, 
Anthony, & Wynn, 2007, for more details).  
  For learning goal orientation, we used a standard measure from (Button, et al., 1996). The 
measure used a 7-point rating scale that ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
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For intelligence, we used Sternberg’s (1988) checklist of 41 behaviors associated with 
intelligent people. Participants rated the degree to which the behaviors, such as reasoning 
logically and well, were characteristic of themselves on a 9-point rating scale that ranged from 1 
(Low) to 9 (High).  
  Leader role-taking and performance were measured using a previously developed 
wilderness survival task (Pfeiffer & Jones, 1976). To suit our research purposes, we adapted the 
scenario and survival decisions involved in the task to include more leadership elements. 
Specifically, participants were told that while on a team-building retreat in the wilderness of 
Oregon, they and four of their subordinates, none of whom were experienced campers, had 
become separated from the group with little equipment (in the original scenario, participants are 
alone in the wilderness). The simulation involved making challenging decisions in the face of the 
ambiguity, high stakes, and urgency associated with public health and safety crises (Pearson & 
Clair, 1998; Shrivastava, 1993; Sommer & Pearson, 2007). In the scenario, for example, the 
situation gets increasingly dire, from simply being lost in the wilderness to facing extreme 
dehydration, river flooding, and even a bear attack.   
After the background of the scenario was presented, participants were presented with a 
series of 12 decisions to make about how to survive a particular life-threatening circumstance 
and asked to indicate for which decisions they chose to be the lead decision-maker for the group. 
For example, the first decision presented was, “Your group has strayed from your party in 
trackless timber. You have no special signaling equipment. What is the best way to attempt to 
contact the rest of the campers?” Participants were reminded that in real-world crisis situations, 
there is often time for only one person to make a decision and were told to assume that another 
member of the group would make the decision for the group if they choose not to do so. The total 
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number of leadership roles taken out of the twelve possible opportunities was summed for each 
participant. 
  Following this role-taking task, participants were told to imagine that their subordinates 
had voted them as lead decision-maker for all decisions and asked them to choose the best option 
among those offered for each decision. Each of the twelve decisions was repeated, but this time 
participants were given three answer options, one of which had been determined previously by 
the original task authors as the correct one. For example, the first decision was presented as, 
“Your group has strayed from your party in trackless timber. You have no special signaling 
equipment. The best way to attempt to contact the rest of the campers is to tell your colleagues 
to: (a) Call for help loudly, but in a low register, (b) Yell or scream as loudly as you can, or (c) 
Whistle loudly and shrilly.” The answer in this case is to call for help loudly but in a low 
register, as low tones carry farther, especially in dense woodland. The total number of correct 
decisions was summed for each participant. In addition, the total number of correct decisions as 
leader was calculated by summing across the twelve decisions for the cases in which the 
participant had both taken on the leadership role and had answered the question correctly. 
  After completing the crisis decision-making task, participants were asked a series of 
questions about their experiences making the 12 decisions. There were four questions that 
captured the difficulty they experienced making the crisis decisions, such as, “How easy did you 
find it to make decisions as the lead decision-maker for the group?” Another four questions 
captured their confidence in the decisions they had made, such as, “How confident are you that 
your decisions were the correct ones?” The responses were reverse-scored as necessary and 
standardized so that the means could be captured.  
5.2 Predictive and discriminant validity of C-LEAD scale 
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  The psychometric properties of the C-LEAD and the other main variables are presented 
in Table 5. As shown, C-LEAD once again shows strong internal reliability. In addition, as the 
table indicates, participants typically volunteered to take on the decision-making leadership role 
for approximately 8 out of 12 decisions. The number of correct decisions for which the 
individual had taken a leadership role is approximately 3 out of 12 decisions (24.7%).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  The correlations among C-LEAD and the main scale variables are also found in Table 5. 
As shown, C-LEAD was significantly positively correlated with both motivation to lead in a 
crisis (MTLC) and leader role-taking. As expected, MTLC was also correlated with more 
frequent role-taking of leadership positions. However, a separate regression analysis indicated 
that MTLC did not completely mediate the relationship between C-LEAD and leader role-taking, 
as when both C-LEAD and MTLC were entered, C-LEAD (β = .16, p < .05) provided additional 
predictive power above and beyond the motivation to lead (β = .21, p < .01). Thus, C-LEAD was 
associated with higher motivation to lead in a crisis and both directly and indirectly predicted the 
degree to which individuals voluntarily took on crisis leadership roles.  
  In regard to the decision-making variables, higher C-LEAD scores, as collected on the 
first study, predicted many types of performance variables collected 1-2 weeks later on the 
wilderness survival task. Consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2, we found that higher 
levels of C-LEAD were significantly associated with experiencing less difficulty and greater 
confidence during the crisis decision-making process. In addition, C-LEAD significantly 
predicted the number of correct decisions made while in a leadership position. Furthermore, C-
LEAD (β = .17, p < .01) predicted the number of correct in-role decisions even when the degree 
of outdoor experience (β = .16, p < .05) was controlled in a regression analysis. C-LEAD did not 
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predict the total number of correct decisions made irrespective of whether the participant had 
volunteered to be the lead decision-maker for the question. 
  Finally, Table 5 shows that C-LEAD was positively correlated with procedural 
preparedness, learning goal orientation, and intelligence at moderate levels. It was not correlated 
with divergent thinking ability. The measures of procedural preparedness and intelligence 
showed a similar pattern to C-LEAD in that they predicted the number of leader roles taken, the 
number of correct decisions made as leader, decision difficulty, and decision confidence. 
Learning goal orientation significantly predicted leader role-taking, decision difficulty, and 
decision confidence, but not correct decisions as a leader. Divergent thinking significantly 
predicted leader role-taking, correct decisions as leader, and decision confidence, but not 
decision difficulty. None of the variables predicted the total number of correct decisions made 
irrespective of whether the participant was in the leader role for them. 
  Table 6 presents the results of a series of regressions in which learning goal orientation, 
intelligence, and divergent thinking were tested as moderators of the relationships between C-
LEAD and the main decision performance variables. As shown, all variables showed evidence of 
moderating the relationships between C-LEAD and the outcomes of decision accuracy, 
difficulty, and confidence, except in the case of divergent thinking and decision difficulty. 
Separate analyses were conducted to graph the relationships between C-LEAD and the 
performance variables at high and low levels of intelligence, learning goal orientation, and 
divergent thinking, respectively. The results consistently showed a stronger relationship for C-
LEAD when levels of the individual difference characteristics were high; for example, among 
people with relatively higher intelligence, there was a steeper regression line between C-LEAD 
scores and crisis leader accuracy than among people with relatively lower levels of intelligence. 
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Similar patterns were shown for the interaction effects of learning goal orientation and divergent 
thinking upon the relationship between C-LEAD and the performance variables. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.3 Discussion of findings regarding crisis leader efficacy framework 
  The results of the current study reinforce the previous studies’ findings and provide 
additional evidence for the construct validity of the C-LEAD scale in terms of its internal 
reliability, predictive validity, and discriminant validity. As consistent with the findings of 
Studies 1 and 2, we found that procedural crisis preparedness was significantly correlated with 
C-LEAD scores. Thus, efforts to develop and practice crisis response protocols are likely to 
result in higher levels of self- efficacy to assess information and make decisions in a crisis 
context, as one might hope and expect.  
In addition, C-LEAD predicted an important motivational state, the desire to take on 
leadership positions in a crisis situation. This finding is in line with the expectation that 
individuals who feel efficacious to perform a certain behavior in a certain context would be 
willing and eager to demonstrate these capabilities (e.g., Hannah, et al., 2008; Paglis & Green, 
2002). However, high levels of motivation do not always translate into behavioral confirmation 
(e.g., Gist, 1987). In this case, we did find that motivation to lead in a crisis predicted greater 
levels of leader role-taking, even though the measures were separated in time and space. It could 
be that crisis situations, which are urgent and important, create a greater impetus for people to act 
upon their underlying motivational states than ordinary situations. We also found that C-LEAD 
directly predicted leader role-taking irrespective of the level of motivation to lead in a crisis. 
Thus, merely holding a strong belief in their skill to assess information and make decisions in a 
crisis influenced the degree to which people volunteered for decision-making leadership roles. 
 C-LEAD Scale  35
  With regard to the performance variables, we replicated the previous findings that C-
LEAD predicted the difficulty and confidence leaders experience in the crisis decision-making 
process. In addition, while C-LEAD did not predict the total number of correct decisions, it did 
predict the number of correct decisions made while a leader. Thus, C-LEAD predicts accuracy 
when it is most likely to count—when the decision-maker is in the position to enact his or her 
decisions as leader.  
We also learned more about the nature of crisis leader efficacy and its relationship to 
performance through the inclusion of potential individual difference moderators. In general, C-
LEAD was positively correlated with learning goal orientation and intelligence, but not divergent 
thinking. Overall, regression analyses showed that higher levels of each of these characteristics 
may serve to enhance the relationship between crisis leader efficacy and crisis decision-making 
performance. As Woods and Bandura (1989) note, the most effective way that individuals 
develop a sense of self-efficacy is through mastery experiences. It is possible that those 
individuals who have a strong learning goal orientation, are highly intelligent, or can think 
divergently have a more extensive set of mastery experiences to draw upon as they think about 
their crisis leader efficacy. Thus, they are not only more likely to perform well on decision-
making tasks given their natural cognitive capabilities and inclinations, they are also likely to be 
more accurate in their self-assessment on the C-LEAD scale.  
From the results of the three studies, we generated an initial framework of the nature of 
crisis leader efficacy in regard to assessing information and making decisions. As shown in 
Figure 1, the framework specifies the likely relationships among crisis preparedness activities, 
crisis leader efficacy, motivation to lead in a crisis, role-taking of crisis leadership positions, and 
crisis decision-making performance. Finally, it indicates the moderator role that the individual 
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characteristics of learning goal orientation, intelligence, and divergent thinking may play 
between efficacy and performance.  
6. General discussion  
6.1 Summary of main findings 
  Overall, the results of the three studies provide strong evidence that we achieved our 
research objectives. The C-LEAD scale was developed through a literature review and 
interviews with expert individuals who had successfully led others during past public health and 
safety crises. Based on this background work, we focused our measure of crisis leader efficacy 
on the critical behaviors of information assessment and decision-making under the conditions of 
ambiguity, high stakes, and urgency present in a crisis (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Extensive 
pretests were conducted to ensure the scale demonstrated strong face validity and internal 
reliability. To our knowledge, no other scale to evaluate leadership in a crisis has been developed 
in a similarly rigorous empirical manner. 
  Next, we established the construct validity of the C-LEAD scale through a series of three 
studies that incorporated a variety of comparison measures. In the first two studies, we compared 
our measure of crisis leader efficacy to one of general leader efficacy. We found that the two 
measures, although correlated as expected, nonetheless predicted decision-making difficulty and 
confidence differentially. Specifically, our measure of crisis leader efficacy was better at 
predicting difficulty and confidence in making crisis decisions than a measure of general leader 
efficacy. The reverse was found when general leadership decisions were considered; the existing 
measure outshone C-LEAD in predicting performance in a general decision context. Thus, our 
measure of crisis leader efficacy contributes to the field a new tool for assessing and predicting 
leadership in a crisis context, but does not remove the need for separate measures of leadership 
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capabilities in ordinary times. Our tool may capture aspects of leadership that are especially 
critical in a crisis and that may be missed with other existing measures of leadership efficacy 
(e.g., Anderson, et al., 2008; Hannah, et al., 2008; Paglis & Green, 2002; Tett, et al., 2000; Yukl, 
1999).  
As part of the construct validation process, we also captured crisis preparedness in terms 
of procedural aspects of crisis response (Coombs, 2005; Mitroff, 2004). These more formal 
activities to establish and rehearse appropriate behaviors in a crisis (such as establishing 
protocols and practicing them through exercises) should correlate with greater levels of crisis 
leader efficacy, and indeed they do. However, procedural crisis preparedness does not overlap 
completely with our measure of crisis leader efficacy. This implies that simply knowing and 
practicing crisis response plans may be inadequate to ensure that leaders are ready to effectively 
assess information and make decisions in a crisis. Furthermore, we found in the third study that 
our measure of C-LEAD predicted the number of correct decisions made as a leader more 
powerfully than the measure of procedural preparedness, although both were correlated with this 
outcome. Being able to predict decision making more accurately in crisis can make the 
difference between life and death. 
  The third study also allowed us to elaborate upon the nature of crisis leader efficacy and 
its relationship to motivational states, leader role-taking behaviors, individual characteristics, and 
multiple types of crisis decision-making performance. In the study, we showed that C-LEAD 
predicted both motivation to lead in a crisis and the actual volunteering for crisis leader roles. 
Furthermore, we extended the findings of previous studies regarding the predictive power of C-
LEAD on decision-making difficulty and confidence to show it also predicted decision accuracy 
as a leader. Thus, our measure of crisis leader efficacy was useful in estimating how motivated 
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individuals were to lead others in a crisis, how often they took on that role, and how well they 
did once they were in it. Furthermore, our exploration of traits such as learning goal orientation 
and intelligence showed the potential moderating role of these characteristics on the efficacy-
performance relationship. From these findings, we have established an initial framework of the 
nature of crisis leader efficacy that may inspire and guide future research on the topic.  
6.2 Study limitations and future research 
  One potential limitation of the current research stems from the self-report method used 
for C-LEAD and other measures in the study. Any measure of self-efficacy is by nature self-
reported, but this does raise the possibility of self-presentation bias. The lack of relationship 
between C-LEAD and the Social Desirability Scale in Study 2 decreases the potency of this 
concern, but remains a potential limitation that should be addressed in future research. The use of 
expert ratings to assess the accuracy of performance in Study 3 also provides some evidence that 
the use of externally-evaluated performance measures will be predicted by C-LEAD. However, it 
would be useful to measure additional aspects of individuals and their performance through 
methods such as archival data and peer or supervisor ratings to further mitigate potential issues 
related to self-reported measures. In addition, all measures were collected on the same survey 
(except for SDS) in the first two studies, which creates the possibility of common method bias. 
In Studies 1 and 2, we tried to mitigate this concern as much as possible by separating our 
comparison measures of C-LEAD, LSE, and procedural preparedness from each other and from 
the decision-making variables on the surveys. However, it is only in Study 3 that we achieved a 
more robust separation of measures through the issuance of two surveys 10 days apart. 
Nonetheless, it would be ideal to collect the key measures across additional time periods to 
isolate them further.  
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6.3 Synthesis and implications for research and practice 
For decades, academics have been limited in their empirical research on crisis leadership 
due to both practical and theoretical limitations (e.g., Pearson & Clair, 1998; Sweeny, 2008). 
With C-LEAD, we now have a tool to specifically evaluate crisis leaders where one has not 
existed before. Theory building and testing can now be pushed to a new frontier, where the 
unique characteristics of leadership in a crisis can be assessed rather than applying metrics 
applicable to general situations. The ability of C-LEAD to predict outcomes better than a general 
measure of leadership efficacy or procedural preparedness underscores the importance of a 
crisis-specific leadership tool. 
Furthermore, this tool makes a valuable contribution to the practice of leader training and 
development, as it can be used to identify the capabilities of leaders in advance of a crisis so that 
interventions to improve efficacy can be made (Combs & Luthans, 2007; Pearson & Mitroff, 
1993). In addition, since C-LEAD predicts leader role taking, crisis training programs can be 
structured more efficiently to target those most likely to volunteer to take on crisis leader roles. 
Overall, the current research underscores our need to develop a better understanding of 
what “good” crisis leaders look like and how to identify, encourage, and improve the capabilities 
of all those who might respond to a public health and safety crisis. Future research using C-
LEAD will continue to refine our understanding of the nature and measurement of crisis leader 
efficacy and ultimately may enhance our nation’s and the world’s ability to prevent and respond 
to these catastrophic events.  C-LEAD Scale  40
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Figure 1 
A theoretical model of the relationships among procedural crisis training and preparedness, crisis leader self-efficacy, motivation to 
lead in a crisis, crisis leadership role-taking, individual differences, and crisis decision-making performance. 
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Table 1 
The Crisis Leader Efficacy in Assessing and Deciding (C-LEAD) Scale 
1.  I can anticipate the political and interpersonal ramifications of my decisions and actions. 
2.  I can summarize the key issues involved in a situation to others regardless of how much data 
I have. 
3.  I can make decisions and recommendations even when I don't have as much information as I 
would like. 
4.  I can assess how the members of the general public are being impacted by my unit's actions 
or inactions during times of adversity. 
5.  I can determine which information is critical to relay to other units in advance of them 
requesting it. 
6.  I can keep others abreast of my work activities without over-informing or under-informing 
them. 
7.  I can make decisions and recommendations even under extreme time pressure. 
8.  I can estimate the potential deaths and injuries that may occur as the result of my decisions or 
recommendations at work. 
9.  I can modify my regular work activities instantly to respond to an urgent need. 
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Table 2  
Study 1: Correlations between C-LEAD and other variables and their psychometric properties 
 1  2  3  4  5    Mean  SD 
1.  C-LEAD  .83        4.99  .94 
2.  LSE .54**  .95       5.77  .82 
3.  Procedural preparedness  .43**  .61**  .76      5.18  .96 
4.  General decision difficulty  -.13*  -.27**  -.16**  .51     1.83  .55 
5.  General decision confidence  .29**  .41**  .28**  -.53**  .70   3.81  .67 
 
Note. N = 282 for all correlations. LSE = Leadership Self-Efficacy scale. Reliability coefficients (alphas) are presented along the 
diagonal. 
*p < .05. **p < .01.  
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Table 3 
Study 2: Correlations between C-LEAD and other variables and their psychometric properties 
 1  2  3  4  5  6    Mean  SD 
1.  C-LEAD  .81           5.36 .73 
2.  LSE .49**  .93          5.61 .76 
3.  Procedural preparedness  .32**  .37**  .81         4.78  1.05 
4.  Social Desirability Scale .08  .27  .10  .73       8.71  2.68 
5.  Crisis decision difficulty  -.27*  -.10  -.16  .11  .64    2.06  .77 
6.  Crisis decision confidence  .34**  .12  .23*  -.06  -.55**  .82   2.99  .92 
 
Note. N = 73-83 for all correlations except those involving the Social Desirability Scale (N = 50-51). Reliability coefficients (alphas) are 
presented along the diagonal. 
*p < .05. **p < .01
 Table 4  
Studies 1 and 2: Comparative view of regression analyses using decision difficulty and 
confidence variables 
 
 
Study 1: 
General Decision Context 
Study 2: 
Crisis Decision Context 
Decision Difficulty      
 C-LEAD  .02  -.23+ 
 LSE  -.28**  .03 
 Procedural  preparedness  .00  -.07 
      
Decision Confidence       
 C-LEAD  .09  .31* 
 LSE  .33**  -.08 
 Procedural  preparedness  .04  .15 
 
Note. Enter entry method used. N = 282 for Study 1 and N= 79 for Study 2.  
+p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01Table 5 
Study 3: Correlations between C-LEAD and other variables and their psychometric properties 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10  11  12   Mean  SD 
1.  C-LEAD  .88                5.46  .90 
2.  Procedural preparedness  .42**  .84                4.54  .87 
3.  Motivation to lead in a crisis  .52**  .44**  .84              5.11  .85 
4.  Learning goal orientation  .38**  .41**  .15*  .92              5.84  .81 
5.  Intelligence .52**  .41**  .15**  .63**  .97             7.26  .98 
6.  Divergent thinking ability  .09  .20**  .10  .36**  .39**  .90           32.57  17.78 
7.  Number of crisis leader roles taken   .26**  .29**  .23**  .22**  .17**  .29**  --            8.41  3.18 
8.  Total correct decisions   .01  .05  .11  -.02  -.00  .08  .12*  --          4.27  1.73 
9.  Correct decisions as crisis leader  .20**  .22**  .18**  .12*  .10  .24**  .65**  .74**  --        2.96  2.05 
10.  Crisis  decision  difficulty  -.21** -.24**  -.10  -.18** -.14* -.17** -.27** -.17** -.27**  .60     .00  .73 
11.  Crisis  decision  confidence  .27** .26** .17** .25** .21** .33** .48** .15** .39** -.54**  .84   .06 .77 
 
Note. N = 300 for all correlations. Reliability coefficients (alphas) are presented along the diagonal. Crisis decision difficulty and 
confidence measures are standardized. 
*p < .05; **p < .01Table 6 
Study 3: Results of Regression Tests of Individual Difference Moderators of C-LEAD on Decision-Making Variables 
    Crisis Decision Difficulty  Crisis Decision Confidence   Crisis Decision Accuracy 
Learning Goal Orientation (LGO)         
 C-LEAD  -.10  .07  .03 
 LGO  .07  -.04  .06 
  C-LEAD x LGO  -.21**  .29**  .20** 
        
Intelligence        
 C-LEAD  -.04  -.17  -.13 
 Intelligence  .05  .13  .09 
  C-LEAD x Intelligence  -.22**  -.34**  .26** 
        
Divergent Thinking (DT)         
 C-LEAD  .21**  .22**  .15* 
 DT  -.08  -.02  -.21 
  C-LEAD x DT  -.08  .16*  .18** 
        
 
Note. Stepwise entry method used; variables entered in order shown. N = 300. 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
 